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The aim of the article is to ground a new conception of philosophy, namely, philosophy qua heterology. 
This grounding coincides with an overcoming of the philosophy as an onto-theological project. 
The main issue is considering being qua difference. We should base our understanding of being on 
difference instead of the difference between being and beings, as being and beings emerge “between”. 
This “between”, however, is not a moment in time or a position in space, but, on the contrary, this is 
time-space, the operation of being as an event which precedes any objectivation in space and time. 
Explication of philosophy qua heterology necessitates the transformation of a number of fundamental 
philosophical concepts, such as becoming, difference, event and multiplicity.
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The article aims at formulating a new 
conception of philosophy, namely, philosophy 
qua heterology. That is to say, heterology 
signifies the beyond of philosophy as an onto-
theological project and breaks all the ties with 
classical metaphysics and philosophy of science. 
The advent of heterology entails a radical 
transformation of philosophy’s very nature. The 
transformation is ambiguous: firstly, ontology 
transforms into onto-genesis – the study of 
becoming of various systems and phenomena; 
secondly, ontology becomes heterogenesis – the 
study of becoming as becoming of difference, 
plurality and multiplicity (Kerimov, 2012, p. 
83-84). In heterological sense, becoming is 
always becoming of difference and multiplicity. 
Difference and multiplicity are, accordingly, the 
notions that are momentous for the appreciation 
of heterology.
However, before we consider heterology 
as such, let us recapitulate the two classical 
approaches to being, that is to say, the two 
possibilities of describing being in the sphere of 
ontology. Although both approaches formally 
belong to ontology, they are, in effect, radically 
different.
The essence of the first approach lies in the 
substitution of the question of being with the 
question of the origins of beings. In this respect, 
being, as it is understood, is nothing else, but a 
ground. Then, a ground is made tantamount to 
a cause which, in turn, becomes the Absolute. 
Such an understanding of being is, needless 
to say, traditional for philosophy. Indeed, the 
metaphysical gesture par excellence is to correlate 
being with the ground of beings. From Thales 
to Husserl, philosophy had been preoccupied 
with finding the grounds of beings. At different 
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periods we had the elements of nature, God or the 
transcendental ego as the ground of beings. Thus, 
the question of being of beings coincides with the 
search of the supreme beings as the measure and 
the limit for what beings as such is capable of.
What is the limitation of the first approach? 
According to this approach, being becomes 
inseparable from the “transcendental signifier”, 
situated outside of beings. However, it does not 
relate being to a “transcendental signifier” taking 
the very question of being outside of its sphere. 
Indeed, the gesture of taking being outside of itself 
is precisely what inevitably turns metaphysics 
into a closed and total system. Furthermore, this 
very gesture makes any metaphysical search 
indistinguishable from the search for God. 
Heidegger has clearly identified ontheological 
structure of the first approach: “But if we recollect 
once again the history of Occidental-European 
thought, then we see that the question of being, 
taken as a question about the being of beings, is 
double in form. On the one hand it asks: What are 
beings, in general, as beings? Considerations come 
within the province of this question in the course 
of the history of philosophy under the heading of 
ontology. The question ‘What is beings?’ includes 
also the question, “Which being is the highest, 
and in what way? The question is about the divine 
and God. The province of this question is called 
theology. The duality of the question about the 
Being of beings can be brought together under the 
title of “onto-theo-logy” (Heidegger, 1976, p.23).
Let us now return to the second approach. 
In this perspective, the focus is not on the origins 
of beings, but on the very being of beings. 
More precisely, the second approach rejects the 
metaphysics of origins and preoccupies itself with 
beings-without-ground. That is to say, nothing 
engenders being but beings. By the same logic, 
there is no being apart from beings. 
There is, thus, an unbridgeable gap between 
being and beings. There is no causal relationship 
between them. What does this mean? If there is 
no causality between being and beings, then 
being cannot be said to determine beings. Yet, 
being is the very ground of beings. How is this 
possible? In essence, being is an abyss, it is 
always an abyssal, lacking ground. Such abyss 
is, however, generative. To refuse to provide 
ground to beings is the act of liberating beings, 
of letting it be. To formulate it differently, the 
abyssal ground is the only true ground. Only 
the abyssal ground engenders unfettered beings, 
beings that are beyond their ground, beings as 
excess.
In this lies the ambiguity of being qua abyss. 
It is, at one and the same time, an abyss and a 
ground. This is the essence of Ab-gründung which 
signifies both the lack of ground (Ab-gründ) 
and lack as ground (Ab-gründung). Still more 
precisely: being qua abyssal ground is the ground 
of beings, according to the second approach. 
However, the grounding movement in 
question is, again, ambiguous. Neither being nor 
beings come first. That is to say, being cannot 
truly precede beings because it is, in effect, an 
abyss. Yet, beings cannot precede being either, 
for they need being qua abyss as their ground. 
This is a paradoxical yet momentous point.
In the light of this, it is necessary to reverse 
the order of the ontico-ontological exposition 
properly. The reversal is the following: being 
does not precede difference qua supplement, 
instead, difference/multiplicity is the very 
essence of being: “Let us take up the matter again, 
then, not beginning from the Being of being 
and proceeding to being itself being with-one-
another [étant l’un-avec-lautre], but starting from 
being—and all of being—determined in its Being 
as being with-one-another. [This is the] singular 
plural in such a way that the singularity of each 
is indissociable from its being-with-many and 
because, in general, a singularity is indissociable 
from a plurality. Here again, it is not a question 
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of any supplementary property of Being” (Nancy, 
2004, p. 60). I will elaborate more on this later.
Let us first recapitulate the two approaches 
to being exposed above: the first approach 
assimilates being with the ground of beings. In 
this perspective, the question of being as such 
is canceled out. Thus, there remains only the 
question of grounding beings. In contrast, the 
second approach allows us to gain access to 
being itself. Yet, this approach still contains a 
rather problematic paradox. The paradox is that, 
literally, being is not, for “is” can only refer to 
beings. This does not mean, however, that being 
is nothing. Rather, being is no-thing. Being is, 
then, different from beings, however, it is also 
inseparable from them.
The answer to this enigma is that being 
is always being of beings and there is no being 
without beings. By the same logic, there are no 
beings without being. In light of this, how can 
being be different from beings? An appropriate 
formulation of the relationship between being 
and beings would be the following: being is the 
operation that lets beings be. Alternatively, being 
makes beings enter presence. Also, being is via 
its difference from beings. Emmanuel Levinas 
explains this in a very fair way: “The most 
extraordinary thing which Heidegger brings us is 
a new sonority of the verb “to be”: precisely its 
verbal sonority. To be: not what is, but the verb, 
the “act” of being. (In German, the difference is 
easily drawn between Sein [to be] and Seiendes 
[beings], and the latter word does not have in 
German the foreign sonority that the French 
étant [a being] carries, such that Heidegger’s first 
translators had to write it in the quotation marks.) 
This contribution is unforgettable in the work of 
Heidegger. It has the following consequences: 
2. The radical distinction between being and 
beings, the famous ontological difference. There 
is radical difference between the verbal resonance 
of the word being and its resonance as a noun. It 
is the difference par excellence. It is Difference. 
Every difference supposes a certain community; 
between being and beings, however, there is 
nothing in common… 3. Language. It is the site 
of this difference; it is here, in language, where 
being is lodged. Language is the house of being. 
4. The forgetting of the difference. This difference 
has been forgotten, and that forgetting constitutes 
Western thought. (Levinas, 1993, p. 122) Thus, 
before it becomes a noun, being is always an 
indefinite verb. Beings come into presence 
through substantification of being as a verb. In 
this way, being becomes something, a thing. 
Consequently, in order to preserve the difference 
between being as a verb and substantificated 
being, let us use “to be” in lieu of “being”. Once 
again, what is important for us here is to preserve 
the procedural, verbal character of being.
Being is becoming, the event of becoming. 
Taking clue from Heidegger let us regard “to be” 
as the original event due to which anything or 
any event, including language, takes place. In this 
respect, does not being become the singular event, 
the event of all events? In other words, being is 
the eventness of all other events: “This way of 
being finds itself somehow at the limit. At the 
surface of being, the nature of which is not able 
to change: it is, in fact, neither active nor passive, 
for passivity would presuppose a corporeal nature 
which undergoes an action. It is purely and simply 
a result or an effect which is not to be classified 
among beings ... [The Stoics distinguished] two 
radical planes of being, something that no one 
had done before them: on the one hand, real and 
profound being, force; on the other, the plane of 
facts, which frolic on the surface of being, and 
constitute an endless multiplicity of incorporeal 
beings” (Deleuze, 1998, p. 20-21).
The corollary of this passage is the 
following: being is not a thing which appears in 
space and time, but, instead, it is unsubstantial 
and incorporeal. As I have argued above, being 
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is no-thing. However, by being no-thing, being 
unfolds “between” closure and disclosure, 
presence and absence. The “between” in this 
respect is not, however, a moment in time or a 
position is space, but, on the contrary, it is time-
space. To be more precise, the very operation 
of being qua event precedes any objectivation 
in space and time; being ultimately escapes 
Ptolemaic physics, Aristotelian physics, and 
Newtonian physics and even the curved and 
finite space-time of the general theory of 
relativity. The space-time of being is rather 
the coincidence of the past, the present and the 
future. That is to say, the future and the past 
emerge simultaneously with the present. Each 
moment the present bifurcates into two opposite 
streams – the past and the future. In this sense, 
the present is a pure event; its role is to divide and 
break itself up into the past and the future. As 
a pure and empty presence, the present reveals 
the very negativity of time’s origins. Although 
the present is the passage from “already not” to 
“not yet”, it is a passage without passage. It is 
the indefinite verb “to be” that is situated at the 
void between the future and the past. This void 
is the present. This means that the present is not 
really between the two instances of time. Rather, 
it is the very timelessness of a pure event. Once 
again, the present, the “between” is, in effect, 
emptiness. A pure event is always emptiness. In 
consequence, time in its proper sense emerges 
from the bifurcation of the present moment as 
a pure event. This event liberates both the past 
and the future.
Let us now study the economy of the 
event more closely. Whereas temporalization 
is, in effect, the dissolution of the event and the 
liberation of the future and the past, spatialization 
is that which puts a check on this uncontrollable 
diffusion. Essentially, spatialization insulates the 
process of temporalization. Time is diffusion, 
space is assembly. Space is spatialization of time; 
time is temporalization of space. More precisely: 
the becoming of space is the becoming-time of 
space; the becoming of time is the becoming-
space of time. Time, then, becomes finite via 
space. At this junction: being is finite time. It is 
exactly such horizonality of space in time that 
signifies the point of intersection between being 
and finitude. 
Time and space can only be understood via 
that which is liberated by the event. The emptiness 
of the event is precisely the gape which hosts the 
multiplicity of events and possibilities. Moreover, 
the event opens up through the opposition between 
various trends; it is the very clash of antagonisms: 
presence and absence, fort and da, the past and 
the future. These clashes result in precisely the 
spatialization of space and the temporalization of 
time; the advent to presence coincides with the 
retreat into absence. 
Hereby, the decisive issue for us becomes 
thinking being qua difference. That is to say, 
we should base our understanding of being on 
difference as such instead of the difference 
between being and beings. Being qua difference 
is the very between out of which the difference 
between being and beings emerges. It follows that 
being is the original generative fissure or scission. 
Being separates and brings together at one and 
the same time. Once again, being as difference 
is not simple diffusion but also assembly. It is 
neither just time qua diffusion nor space qua 
assembly. It is space-time, diffusion-assembly. 
In this perspective, being qua the “between” is 
a perpetual generative violence. The passage 
from the ontico-ontological difference between 
time and space to the ontological difference qua 
the “between” qua space-time is central to post-
Heideggerian philosophy.
This way, we take ontico-ontological 
difference to its very origins – the unfolding of 
being qua event. However, upon discovering that 
the original event itself is difference, we find 
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out that being as difference precedes ontico-
ontological difference between being and beings. 
It follows that the event is the very difference as the 
becoming of the world. Difference as becoming is 
the ground for all the other differences, including, 
the difference between being and beings. 
Thus, our explication of being necessitates 
the transformation of a number of fundamental 
philosophical concepts, for example, becoming, 
difference, substance and event.
From being to becoming. It is philosophy’s 
traditional move to posit being as presence 
against becoming as process. This opposition 
was sanctioned by Plato and is still in circulation 
today. In the context of this opposition, being is 
stable and consistent with itself, while becoming 
is, in essence, an ongoing difference from itself. 
For example, in Hegel becoming still remains a 
captive of an artificial movement of the mediated 
and the unmediated, the movement of thought 
towards the universality of the Concept. In this 
movement, the concept of becoming is already 
mediated by the Concept, since the movement 
of philosophy is always positing that which is 
already contained in the Concept.
Hegel’s experience shows us that 
differentiating between being and becoming 
inevitably leads to essentialism. When we exhibit 
a certain thing via its becoming, we, on the 
contrary, distance ourselves from essentialism. 
Indeed, once we reject transcendental essences 
and fully commit to immanent actualities, 
essentialism is gone. However, thinking the 
process may easily turn into thinking the essence 
of the process, as well. The fallacy of such a 
transformation is that it results in becoming 
being taken outside of itself and, thus, referred to 
something external, for example, another subject. 
Yet, does not becoming involve nothing but itself? 
It does not produce anything but becoming as 
such. By the same token, the subject of becoming 
is the becoming itself. 
In this light, the reformulation of being 
as “to be” entails the reformulation of the 
notion of becoming, as well. More precisely: 
the passage from being to becoming becomes 
possible precisely at the moment when “to be” 
is understood as the genetic and differential 
condition of reality. That is to say, being ceases 
to be mediated via the Concept, instead, it is 
construed as the actual process of becoming 
of beings, that is, being qua becoming. At this 
junction, I propose the following reformulation of 
the ontological difference: difference-becoming 
of being (and) beings. 
Let us dwell (study) on the notion of 
becoming little longer: becoming is never a 
linear process qua passage from actuality to 
another actuality. On the contrary, it is the 
movement from the actual to the actualization 
of the virtual, that is, the new actual. Becoming 
is difference; it is the virtual space between 
actualizations. Still more precisely: becoming 
takes place exactly between the virtual and 
its actualizations. In this sense, “to be” is 
the virtual, while beings are the actual. 
Furthermore, becoming is fully immanent to 
reality. It follows that becoming is also always 
excessive in regard to reality. No actualities 
exhaust becoming. Consequently, becoming 
qua multiplicity is always virtual. In addition, 
becoming is never given by itself, for it is 
inseparable from beings.
Becoming – being, a non-linear process of 
transition from one actual to another actual – can 
be seen as a transition from the actual through 
the dynamic field of virtual tendencies to the 
actualization of this very field into the new 
actual. Becoming is understood here as the very 
difference insofar as it divides and separates 
actualizing virtual differences (Deleuze, 1998, 
p. 57-58). 
The fact that the virtual is real and forms an 
aspect of real is of principal significance here. 
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The actuality of the virtual is constituted upon 
differentiated elements, their inter-relations and 
the singular points correlative to them. It means 
that the virtual is fully defined and denotes 
genetic differentiated elements. Nevertheless, 
virtual, in spite of its definitiveness, is just 
an aspect of an object. Actuality constitutes 
another aspect. Between these two aspects of an 
object or of an actual, takes place a transition, 
a transposition, but not mediation. Mediation 
takes place solely among readymade, already 
constituted and individualized things, while 
becoming – is a movement of actualization from 
virtual to actual. Consequently, actualization – 
is another aspect of the process due to which 
a phenomenon phenomenalizes. The question 
here is how virtual multiplicities realize as 
actualities. The relationship between these 
two sides is not the relationship of sameness 
and likeness, an authenticity and an image, a 
model and a copy. Insofar as virtual is repeated 
in actual, it is repetition-in-difference. And 
if virtual is repeated in actual, it is repetition 
through difference, the result of which is 
heterogeneity between repetition and the 
repeated.
The transformation of the notion of becoming 
that I suggest signifies the turning away from 
the metaphysics of substances and essences. 
Instead of essences, difference is introduced as 
structuring the relationship between being and 
beings. In other words, the relationship between 
them is of perpetual differentiation. In this 
perspective, “to be” – as a virtual multiplicity 
and not an essence – is the event. Thus, instead of 
grounding beings, “to be” ungrounds them. Once 
again, being as becoming is an abyssal ground, a 
gape or an original fissure which, nevertheless, 
generates order and continuity. 
From identity to difference. Properly 
speaking, difference never becomes a genuine one 
in traditional philosophy. Let us take Aristotle, 
for instance. In his perspective, difference is 
heterogeneity or otherness. Thus, for Aristotle, 
for two things to be different from each other they 
must, firstly, be necessarily identical with each 
other in some respects, for example, in genus. It is 
only against identity that difference can be sought 
for Aristotle: “the other” and “the same,” then, 
are opposed in this way; but difference is distinct 
from “otherness.” For that which is other than 
something else need not be other in a particular 
respect, since everything that is either “the other” 
or “the same.” But that which is different from 
something is different in some particular respect 
so that in what they differ must itself be identical, 
for example, the genus or the species. (Aristotel, 
1975, p. 258-259) 
Let us now proceed to Hegel. According 
to Hegel, difference is a part of the following 
progression: identity – difference – diversity – 
opposition – contradiction – ground: “And if the 
distinction differentiating them is then taken 
with greater precision, the difference turns into 
opposition and consequently into contradiction 
and the sum-total of all the realities in 
general into absolute internal contradiction” 
(Hegel, 1997, p. 393). The upshot is: diversity 
is negation at the point of contradiction; 
contradiction appears at the closing of the 
sequence as the truth of all previous reflections. 
Hegel writes: “Difference as such is already 
implicitly contradiction” (Hegel, 1997, p. 390). 
It follows that, for Hegel, difference is merely 
a background against which identity manifests 
itself. Implicitly contradiction, difference 
remains a subject to the identity of being as 
a ground. Thus, in both Aristotle and Hegel, 
identity precedes difference. 
Additionally, both Hegel and Aristotle 
operate on the ontic level: for both Hegel and 
Aristotle, difference is a spatial category, that 
is, difference between identities positioned in 
space. In the same way, difference belongs to the 
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domain of the empirical. Aristotle commences 
with precisely the variety of that which is 
given and, then, tries to dissect the given by 
differentiating among objects in it, according to 
their characteristics. Hegel, on the other hand, 
conceives of diversity as something intrinsic 
to being. In consequence, each being always 
already contains its own diversity within itself. 
This way, diversity belongs to being even outside 
its relationships with the other beings. Hegel’s 
approach seems different to the one of Aristotle at 
the first sight, however, both of these approaches 
contain the same weak point. To show this weak 
point, a brief detour by Deleuze can be revealing: 
“Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but 
difference is that by which the given is given, that 
by which the given is given as diverse. Difference 
is not a phenomenon but the noumenon, closest to 
the phenomenon» (Deleuze, 1998, p. 222). Is this 
not precisely what Heidegger introduced as the 
difference between difference and difference? 
Is this not exactly what Heidegger attempted to 
oppose to the whole metaphysical tradition? For 
Heidegger, Aristotle’s distinction between ousia 
and hypokeimenon remains true and so does 
the distinction between esse and ens in Thomas 
Aquinas, for example. However, what escapes 
both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas is difference 
within each term. To this intrinsic difference we 
gain access by accepting being as the genetic and 
differential condition of actual experience. This 
way, being as becoming (as a movement from 
the virtual to the actual) is precisely the sought 
intrinsic difference. 
Once again, what interests us is not 
the difference between things but things as 
differences, as becomings. The kind of difference 
we seek for is difference as becoming which is 
immanent in relation to itself. Such becoming is 
never eccentric to itself. It is not position-change 
in space, rather, it is qualitative transformation 
and variation in itself, immanent multiplicity-
differentiation. This is becoming as other than 
itself within itself.
A momentous point here is the following: 
whereas becoming as position-change does not 
affect the nature of being, becoming as multiplicity 
is ultimately the indefatigable qualitative variation 
in the very nature of being. Becoming concerns 
beings as such, while becoming as position-
change concerns space. That is to say, we need 
to concern ourselves with difference within being 
rather than difference in space, as a supplement. 
From substance to event. If being is 
becoming then the event is that which structures 
becoming: The event indicates what has to be 
thought at the very heart of becoming, pointing 
to it as something more deeply withdrawn and 
more decisive than the “passage-into” to which it 
is ordinarily reduced. Insofar, as it is understood 
as “passage-into,” becoming primarily indicates 
that which is passed into, the having-become 
[l’etre-devenu] of its result. But in order for the 
passage to take place, in step with the passing 
[dans le pas du passer], there must first be the 
agitated “unrest” (haltungslose Unruhe), which 
has not yet passed and does not pass as such – but 
happens. ( Nancy, 2004, p. 242) 
What is the meaning of substance in the 
philosophy of Aristotle? For him, substance as 
ousia has two meanings: 1) it is that what is given 
before us; 2) it is that what grounds the given-
before-us. In the first sense, substance – as that 
what is present – can accommodate any beings. 
In the second sense, substance is the essence of 
thing, the solid and consistent core. This core 
always remains the same throughout changes. 
Aristotelian system of ousia-hypokeimenon is 
present at its utmost in Hegelian final metaphysics 
of subjectivity: the Absolute consciousness is 
not a human consciousness, but the very being/
substance of the material world: “Everything turns 
on grasping and expressing the True, not only as 
Substance, but equally as Subject” (Hegel, 1992, 
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p. 9). Needless to say, Hegelian telos is conceived 
upon the appropriation of the dynamic concept of 
substance. 
Heterology, on the other hand, surmounts 
the hegemony of the substantivist ontology. 
Heterology’s starting point is differentiation, 
becoming as differentiation which, in fact, precedes 
any identity and/or substance. Furthermore, in 
heterological perspective, difference is not an 
accident, since this would result in nothing other 
than heterology’s back-sliding into substantivism, 
but an event. This is precisely the passage from 
the ontology of essences and substances to the 
ontology of events and multiplicities. 
Thus, only heterology can cover events 
truthfully; events inevitably escape metaphysics 
because they lack substance. To formulate it 
differently, metaphysics looks for things and 
events are not things. Heterology, in contrast, 
equates being with becoming and thus abandons 
essences and substance. In this connection, 
substance becomes an event. The essence of 
grass is, for example, its greening. Moreover, 
there is really no grass, instead, there is only 
greening. Verbs precede nouns; nouns are 
a metaphysical delusion. In this light, the 
ontological transformation we have just exposed 
changes both readings of substance. That is, 
substance is no more than what is in front of us. 
By the same token, it is no more the consistent 
core of a thing.
From essence to multiplicity. Once again, 
what is becoming? Becoming is the virtual 
multiplicity the singular points of which are 
events. Besides, becoming takes place between 
the virtual “to be” and its actualization. 
In contrast to essences, which are always 
abstract and general, multiplicities are singular 
and concrete-universal. They are singularities 
constitutive of actual processes. Furthermore, 
concrete-universality of multiplicities is 
always dissecting: multiplicities can never be 
fully realized. They are inexhaustible in their 
potentialities. In other words, the gap between 
potentialities and actualities cannot be bridged 
for multiplicities. Besides, multiplicities only 
mold the processes and never the final results of 
these processes. In this connection, the results 
of the processes realizing the same multiplicity 
will never coincide. And, finally: in contrast 
to abstract essences co-existing together as an 
abstract universality, concrete universalities form 
a network-like continuum. Any multiplicity is 
always-already a mélange of other multiplicities 
forming continuous immanent space different 
from both the space of a genus and the space of 
discrete elements.
Whereas substantivism-essentialism 
proceeds from homogeneous and a-temporal 
identity, multiplicities lack unity and a-priori 
identity. Whereas substantivism-essentialism 
thinks the relationship between the essence and 
its actuality is similar to the relationship between 
the model and its copy, heterology acknowledges 
the divergence of realizations. Furthermore, in 
contrast to substantivism-essentialism describing 
matter as a passive receptacle of external 
forms pregnant with eidos, multiplicity – being 
immanent in relation to material processes – 
provides them with spontaneity of generation 
regardless of external intervention. 
In heterological perspective, Being is no 
more equated with substance or essence, but is 
instead equated to an event. It is no more the 
foundation of being, but what being does not 
found
itself upon. Heterology is neither fundamental 
nor unfundamental ontology. Contrariwise, it
is the ontology of groundlessness. Ontology 
no more escapes from becoming as the only 
modality of being. Philosophy turns its face to 
this unfoundation as to the condition of becoming 
for the material systems and others, and explores 
the time-space of actualization of these systems.
Tapdyg Kh. Kerimov. Philosophy as Heterology
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Философия как гетерология
Т.Х. Керимов
Уральский федеральный университет им. Б.Н. Ельцина, 
Россия 620083, Екатеринбург, пр. Ленина, 51
Цель статьи заключается в обосновании гетерологической концепции современной философии. 
Горизонтом этого обоснования служит преодоление онтотеологического проекта 
философии. Решающий вопрос заключается в том, чтобы мыслить бытие как различие. 
Нам следует мыслить бытие не на основе онтико-онтологического различия (различия 
бытия и сущего), но на основе различия, т. е. как само «между», в котором открываются 
бытие и сущее. Но это «между» – не столько момент во времени или место в пространстве, 
сколько время-пространство, сама операция бытия как события, предшествующая всякой 
объективации пространства и времени. Обоснование философии как гетерологии влечет 
за собой трансформацию самих философских понятий – становления, различия, события и 
множественности.
Ключевые слова: философия, гетерология, становление, различие, событие, 
мультиплицитность.
